Libya : A Brief Case Study Of Modern Libya Up To Now:

chuck

Well-Known Member
REGISTERED MEMBER
Aug 9, 2003
13,471
2,160
The Revolution and Social Change
Libya Table of Contents

In their September 1969 revolution, Qadhafi and the young officers who provided most of his support aimed with idealistic fervor at bringing to an end the social inequities that had marked both the colonial periods and the monarchical regime. The new government that resulted was socialist, but Qadhafi stressed that it was to be a kind of socialism inspired by the humanitarian values inherent in Islam. It called for equitable distribution to reduce disparities between classes in a peaceful and affluent society, but in no sense was it to be a stage on the road to communism.

On the eve of the 1969 revolution, the royal family and its most eminent supporters and officeholders, drawn from a restricted circle of wealthy and influential families, dominated Libyan society. These constituted what may be termed the traditional sociopolitical establishment, which rested on patronage, clientage, and dependency. Beneath this top echelon was a small middle class. The Libyan middle class had always been quite small, but it had expanded significantly under the impact of oil wealth. In the mid- l960s, it consisted of several distinct social groupings: salaried religious leaders and bureaucrats, old families engaged in importing and contracting, entrepreneurs in the oil business, shopkeepers, self-employed merchants and artisans and prosperous farmers and beduin. Workers in small industrial workshops, agricultural laborers, and peasant farmers, among others, composed the lower class.

Most of the urban population consisted of the families of first-generation workers, small shopkeepers, and a horde of public workers. Above them were thin layers of the newly rich and of old, prosperous families. An urban working class, however, had largely failed to develop, and the middle class was a feeble one that in no way resembled the counterpart element that had become a vital political force in many other countries of the Arab world.

At the top of the rural social structure, the shaykhs of the major tribes ruled on the basis of inherited status. In the cities, corresponding roles were played by the heads of the wealthy families and by religious figures. These leaders were jealous of their position and, far from concerning themselves with furthering social progress, saw modernization as a threat. In no way, however, did the leaders present a united front.

The development of the petroleum industry was accompanied by profound technical and organizational changes and by the appearance of a younger elite whose outlook had been greatly affected by technological advances: among their number were technocrats, students, and young army officers. Not the least notable of the factors that set this new element apart was age. The civilians of this group, as well as the military officers, were for the most part in their thirties or younger, and their views had little in common with those of the aging authorities who had long controlled a swollen bureaucracy (11 percent of the 1969 labor force). More urbanized and better educated than their elders, this new group entertained hopes and aspirations that had been frustrated by the group surrounding King Idris. In particular, resentment had been aroused by the arbitrariness, corruption, and inefficiency of Idris' government as well as by its questionable probity in the distribution of oil-funded revenues.

The young officers who formed the Free Officers Movement and its political nucleus, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), showed a great deal of dedication to the revolutionary cause and a high degree of uniformity in political and economic outlook. In Libya, as in a number of other Arab countries, admission to the military academy and careers as army officers were options available to members of the less privileged economic strata only after national independence was attained. A military career, offering new opportunities for higher education and upward economic and social mobility, was thus a greater attraction for young men from poorer families than for those of the wealthy and the traditional elite. These youthful revolutionaries came from quite modest social backgrounds, representing the oases and the interior as opposed to the coastal cities, and the minor suppressed tribes as opposed to the major aristocratic ones.

The officers of the RCC--all captains and lieutenants-- represented the forefront of a social revolution that saw the middle and lower middle classes assert control over social and political prerogatives heretofore denied them. They quickly displaced the former elite of the Idris era and became themselves the prime movers of the Libyan state. Numbering only about a dozen men, they were gradually joined by sympathetic civilian and military personnel in constituting a new elite.

By the late 1980s, this governing class consisted of Qadhafi and the half-dozen remaining members of the Free Officers Movement, government ministers and other high state officials and managers, second-echelon officers of the Free Officers Movement, and top officials and activists of local mass organizations and governing councils. Civilian officials and bureaucrats as a whole were considerably better educated than their military colleagues. Many of them possessed college degrees, came from urban middle-class backgrounds, and were indispensable for the administrative functioning of government and the economy. Below this elite was the upper middle class composed of educated technocrats, administrators, and remnants of a wealthy commercial and entrepreneurial class. The lower middle class contained small traders, teachers, successful farmers, and low-level officials and bureaucrats. This new and small revolutionary elite sought to restructure Libyan society. In broad terms, the young officers set off to create an egalitarian society in which class differences would be minimal and the country's oil wealth would be equally shared. Their aim was to curb the power and wealth of the old elite and to build support among the middle and lower middle classes from which they had come and with which they identified. The policies they devised to remold society after 1969 entailed extension of state control over the national economy, creation of a new political structure, and redistribution of wealth and opportunity through such measures as minimum wage laws, state employment, and the welfare state.

The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) created in 1971 was thus intended as a mass mobilization device. Its aim was the peaceful abolition of class differences to avoid the tragedy of a class struggle; the egalitarian nature of its composition was shown by a charter prescribing that, at all levels, 50 percent of its members must be peasants and laborers. At the heart of the cultural revolution of 1973 was the establishment of people's committees. These were made up of working-level leaders in business and government, who became the local elites in the new society. That same year brought enactment of a law requiring that larger business firms share profits with their personnel, appoint workers to their boards of directors, and establish joint councils composed of workers and managers.

At the same time, the government launched a long-term campaign against a new privileged class pejoratively identified as "bourgeois bureaucrats." Multiple dismissals at this time included top university administrators, hospital directors, and oil-industry officials, as well as numerous lower ranking employees. However, in 1975, public administrators, including educational and public health service, made up nearly 24 percent of the labor force---more than twice the proportion at the time of the monarchy's demise. Late in 1976, a newspaper editorial complained that the labor force still contained tens of thousands of administrators and supervisors--most of them in the public sector---while in other countries this element seldom exceeded 2 percent of the total.

Having attacked the bureaucracy and concentrations of wealth and privilege, the regime in the later 1970s dealt with the entrepreneurial middle class. The first restrictions on private traders appeared as early as 1975, but the real blows came a few years later. A 1978 law struck at much-prized investments in private property by limiting ownership of houses and apartments to one per nuclear family, although the government promised compensation to the dispossessed. New restrictions were placed on commercial and industrial establishments, foreign trade became a monopoly of public corporations, workers assumed control of major industrial and commercial enterprises, and private wholesale trade was abolished. Finally, state investments and subsidies were shifted away from small businesspeople.

Although the Libyan middle class was suppressed by the abovementional restrictions in the late 1970s, it was not destroyed. Indeed, a significant number of its members adapted themselves to the social dictates of the revolutionary regime by cooperation with it or by recruitment into the modernizing state apparatus. Its ranks still contained educated technocrats and administrators, without whose talents the state could not function, as well as remnants of the commercial and entrepreneurial class, some of them well-to-do. A separate category of small traders, shopkeepers, and farmers could also be identified. They, too, sought careers in the state sector, although many of them continued to operate small businesses alongside public enterprises. Those who could not adapt or who feared persecution fled abroad in significant numbers.

In contrast with the old regime, it was now possible for members of the middle and lower classes to seek and gain access to positions of influence and power. The former criteria of high family or tribal status had given way to education to a considerable degree, although patronage and loyalty continued to be rewarded as well. But in general, social mobility was much improved, a product of the revolutionary order that encouraged participation and leadership in such new institutions as the Basic People's Congress and the revolutionary committees. Only the highest positions occupied by Qadhafi and a small number of his associates were beyond the theoretical reach of the politically ambitious.

The core elite in the 1980s, which consisted of Qadhafi and the few remaining military officers of the RCC, presented a significant contrast of its own with respect to the top political leadership of the Idris era. This was the result of a commitment to national unity and identity, as well as of common social background. Within this small group, the deeply ingrained regional cleavages of the past, particularly that between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, had almost disappeared and were no longer of political significance. Similarly, the ethnic distinction between Arab and Berber within the elite was no longer important. The old urban-rural and center- periphery oppositions, remained very important, but they did not characterize the core elite itself. Rather, they differentiated the core elite from the country's former rulers, because the revolutionary leadership was deeply rooted in the rural periphery, not the Mediterranean coastal centers.

The rest of society, including government officials immediately below Qadhafi, appeared to be a good deal less unified. Despite the exertions of the core elite, a sense of national unity and identity had not yet developed in the late 1980s, and loyalty to region, tribe, and family remained stronger than allegiance to the state. There was much alienation from the regime, often expressed in terms of lethargy and passivity. Incessant pressures on the part of the regime to enlist as many people as possible in running public affairs had provoked much resentment and resistance. Many adults did not participate, despite the exhortations and oversight of the revolutionary committees, themselves a source of uncertainly and anxiety.

All of these pressures applied to the educated middle class, estimated to number perhaps 50,000 out of a total population of 3.6 million. Many were clearly alienated by the shortages of consumer goods, the militarization of society, and the constant demands to participate actively in the institutions of the jamahiriya, sentiments that characterized other social classes as well. Like their fellow citizens, the educated sought refuge in the affairs of their families, demonstrating yet again the strength of traditional values over revolutionary norms, or in foreign travel, especially in Europe.

The country's youth were also pulled in opposite directions. By the mid-1980s, the vast majority knew only the revolutionary era and its achievements. Because these gains were significant, not surprisingly young people were among the most dedicated and visible devotees of the revolution and Qadhafi. They had benefited most from increased educational opportunities, attempted reforms of dowry payments, and the emancipation of young women. Libyan youth also enjoyed far more promising employment prospects than their counterparts elsewhere in the Maghrib.

With few outlets such as recreation centers or movies for their energies, a large number of the youth were found in the revolutionary committees, where they pursued their task of enforcing political conformity and participation with a vigor that at times approached fanaticism. Others kept watch over the state administration and industry in an attempt to improve efficiency. Not all were so enthusiastic about revolutionary goals, however. For instance, there was distaste for military training among students in schools and universities, especially when it presaged service in the armed forces. In the 1980s, some of this disdain had resulted in demonstrations and even in executions.

By the late 1980s, Libyan society clearly showed the impact of almost two decades of attempts at restructuring. The country was an army-dominated state under the influence of no particular class or group and was relatively free from the clash of competing interests. Almost all sources of power in traditional life had been eliminated or coopted. Unlike states such as Saudi Arabia that endeavored to develop their societies within the framework of traditional political and economic systems, Libya had discarded most of the traditional trappings and was using its great wealth to transform the country and its people.


With its highly egalitarian socialist regime, Libya differed considerably in its social structure from other oil-rich states. Salaries and wages were high, and social services were extensive and free. There was much less accumulation of private wealth than in other oil states, and social distinction was discouraged as a matter of deliberate public policy. But Libyan society was deeply divided, and entire segments of the population were only superficially committed to the course that the revolutionary regime had outlined. And while the old order was clearly yielding to the new, there was much doubt and unease about where society and state were headed.

Source: U.S. Library of Congress
 

Chevron Dove

Well-Known Member
REGISTERED MEMBER
May 7, 2009
6,267
2,918
The Revolution and Social Change
Libya Table of Contents

In their September 1969 revolution, Qadhafi and the young officers who provided most of his support aimed with idealistic fervor at bringing to an end the social inequities that had marked both the colonial periods and the monarchical regime. The new government that resulted was socialist, but Qadhafi stressed that it was to be a kind of socialism inspired by the humanitarian values inherent in Islam. It called for equitable distribution to reduce disparities between classes in a peaceful and affluent society, but in no sense was it to be a stage on the road to communism.

On the eve of the 1969 revolution, the royal family and its most eminent supporters and officeholders, drawn from a restricted circle of wealthy and influential families, dominated Libyan society. These constituted what may be termed the traditional sociopolitical establishment,...

...An urban working class, however, had largely failed to develop, and the middle class was a feeble one...

At the top of the rural social structure, the shaykhs of the major tribes ruled on the basis of inherited status. In the cities, corresponding roles were played by the heads of the wealthy families and by religious figures. These leaders were jealous of their position and, far from concerning themselves with furthering social progress, saw modernization as a threat. In no way, however, did the leaders present a united front.

The development of the petroleum industry was accompanied by profound technical and organizational changes and by the appearance of a younger elite ...

...young army officers.

...King Idris. In particular, resentment had been aroused by the arbitrariness, corruption, and inefficiency of Idris' government as well as by its questionable probity in the distribution of oil-funded revenues.

...These youthful revolutionaries came from quite modest social backgrounds, representing the oases and the interior as opposed to the coastal cities, and the minor suppressed tribes as opposed to the major aristocratic ones.

The officers of the RCC--all captains and lieutenants-- represented the forefront of a social revolution that saw the middle and lower middle classes assert control over social and political prerogatives heretofore denied them. They quickly displaced the former elite of the Idris era and became themselves the prime movers of the Libyan state. Numbering only about a dozen men, they were gradually joined by sympathetic civilian and military personnel in constituting a new elite.

By the late 1980s, this governing class consisted of Qadhafi and the half-dozen remaining members of the Free Officers Movement,...

...In broad terms, the young officers set off to create an egalitarian society in which class differences would be minimal and the country's oil wealth would be equally shared. Their aim was to curb the power and wealth of the old elite and to build support among the middle and lower middle classes from which they had come and with which they identified. The policies they devised to remold society after 1969 entailed extension of state control over the national economy, creation of a new political structure, and redistribution of wealth and opportunity through such measures as minimum wage laws, state employment, and the welfare state.

... a charter prescribing that, at all levels, 50 percent of its members must be peasants and laborers....a law requiring that larger business firms share profits with their personnel, appoint workers to their boards of directors, and establish joint councils composed of workers and managers.

At the same time, the government launched a long-term campaign against a new privileged class pejoratively identified as "bourgeois bureaucrats." Multiple dismissals at this time included top university administrators, hospital directors, and oil-industry officials, as well as numerous lower ranking employees. However, in 1975, public administrators, including educational and public health service, made up nearly 24 percent of the labor force---more than twice the proportion at the time of the monarchy's demise. Late in 1976, a newspaper editorial complained that the labor force still contained tens of thousands of administrators and supervisors--most of them in the public sector---while in other countries this element seldom exceeded 2 percent of the total.

...A 1978 law struck at much-prized investments in private property by limiting ownership of houses and apartments to one per nuclear family, although the government promised compensation to the dispossessed. New restrictions were placed on commercial and industrial establishments, foreign trade became a monopoly of public corporations, workers assumed control of major industrial and commercial enterprises, and private wholesale trade was abolished. Finally, state investments and subsidies were shifted away from small businesspeople.

...Those who could not adapt or who feared persecution fled abroad in significant numbers.

In contrast with the old regime, it was now possible for members of the middle and lower classes to seek and gain access to positions of influence and power....

The core elite in the 1980s, which consisted of Qadhafi and the few remaining military officers of the RCC, presented a significant contrast of its own with respect to the top political leadership of the Idris era....Similarly, the ethnic distinction between Arab and Berber within the elite was no longer important....

...in the late 1980s, and loyalty to region, tribe, and family remained stronger than allegiance to the state. There was much alienation from the regime, often expressed in terms of lethargy and passivity. Incessant pressures on the part of the regime to enlist as many people as possible in running public affairs had provoked much resentment and resistance. Many adults did not participate, despite the exhortations and oversight of the revolutionary committees, themselves a source of uncertainly and anxiety.

All of these pressures applied to the educated middle class, estimated to number perhaps 50,000 out of a total population of 3.6 million. Many were clearly alienated by the shortages of consumer goods, the militarization of society, and the constant demands to participate actively in the institutions of the jamahiriya, sentiments that characterized other social classes as well. Like their fellow citizens, the educated sought refuge in the affairs of their families, demonstrating yet again the strength of traditional values over revolutionary norms, or in foreign travel, especially in Europe.

The country's youth were also pulled in opposite directions. By the mid-1980s, the vast majority knew only the revolutionary era and its achievements. Because these gains were significant, not surprisingly young people were among the most dedicated and visible devotees of the revolution and Qadhafi. They had benefited most from increased educational opportunities, attempted reforms of dowry payments, and the emancipation of young women. Libyan youth also enjoyed far more promising employment prospects than their counterparts elsewhere in the Maghrib.

With few outlets such as recreation centers or movies for their energies, a large number of the youth were found in the revolutionary committees, where they pursued their task of enforcing political conformity and participation with a vigor that at times approached fanaticism. Others kept watch over the state administration and industry in an attempt to improve efficiency. Not all were so enthusiastic about revolutionary goals, however. For instance, there was distaste for military training among students in schools and universities, especially when it presaged service in the armed forces. In the 1980s, some of this disdain had resulted in demonstrations and even in executions.

By the late 1980s, Libyan society clearly showed the impact of almost two decades of attempts at restructuring. The country was an army-dominated state under the influence of no particular class or group and was relatively free from the clash of competing interests. Almost all sources of power in traditional life had been eliminated or coopted. Unlike states such as Saudi Arabia that endeavored to develop their societies within the framework of traditional political and economic systems, Libya had discarded most of the traditional trappings and was using its great wealth to transform the country and its people.

With its highly egalitarian socialist regime, Libya differed considerably in its social structure from other oil-rich states. Salaries and wages were high, and social services were extensive and free. There was much less accumulation of private wealth than in other oil states, and social distinction was discouraged as a matter of deliberate public policy. But Libyan society was deeply divided, and entire segments of the population were only superficially committed to the course that the revolutionary regime had outlined. And while the old order was clearly yielding to the new, there was much doubt and unease about where society and state were headed.

Source: U.S. Library of Congress

Wow! This was very informative for me. I think I'm getting it now--a better understanding of what is going on, behind the scenes.

I don't know why I'm thinking this seems similar to what kind of happened in China too.

It seems like this article is saying that the younger generation under the leader is sort of like, calling the shots. And these younger people are the basis of a military system [state] and they came from the disadvantaged groups prior to 1969. So that means to me that the term "the rebels" would be the people from the older system that had benefited and had been pretty much suppressed by the younger generation of military regime.

That would mean to me that when America and the United Nations stepped in to help, they helped 'the rebels' of whom came from civilian sectors, and were people that went against the government for being suppressed by this military regime of younger generations that had been running the government. The old regime of which seems to have been 'socialist' was replaced by a new regime, but they too set up a 'socialist system' but it was said that it would be more geared towards 'Islam'. However, the problems seems to be that it really didn't and therefore sparked a lot of problems from people that are Islam, and these certain Islamic people rebelled. So I guess this means that America and the UN are saying, in essence, to the leader that his regime is wrong in going against 'the rebels', and wrong for killing the civilians, but are these 'civilians' people who are just walking down the street to get groceries, or are they armed civilians of whom have organized against the system and of whom had outside support from somewhere else to try and overturn the militant government? I am now wondering what is the distinction, or is there a distinction in the term we are getting over hear in regards to 'civilians'. Could particular civilians actually be some type of organized regime set up to try and to a coupe?

Now too, because America has stepped in and has drawn opinions from other governments, I want to know more. This article causes me to get a better understanding of how to pose some more strategic questions. For instance, it mentioned 'the Berbers' not being important anymore with regards to the programs that was carried out over the course of about 20 years, but after thinking about the whole content, I don't believe that. This whole article skips over and around certain issues that led up to the 1969 revolution of which I believe 'the Berbers' were apart of the issue as well, and somehow, today, their presence is not so much as being 'unimportant' but more importantly, suppressed to the point where it has become 'unimportant'. Regardless, the Berber populations are still present, but the Black-African Berbers, in my opinion, may have been suppressed and defined as being apart of 'a class' rather than 'a tribal people' who live by traditions. This article becomes an eye opener to me. It makes me think, 'What about the position of the Berbers in the system and those who live south in the sahara?' And still too, I don't know what the term 'Islamic Radicals' refers to.

I'm still wondering what in the world would be the break down on 'Islamic Radicals'. That seems so like a 'generic term' to hide more major issues with regards to probably many different types and cultures of people who have their own set of issues they are holding against the government, and to group them all under a general term of being 'Islamic Radicals' hides more details that could help understand other underlying problems going on, not only in Libya, but in the other Arab countries as well. And then there is another term now being slung around, 'African Mercenaries', a term that compensates for a wider range of people of whom have been grouped in a big category that hided the smaller details. I feel that these three terms, (1) Berbers [ie.Tuaregs], (2) Islamic Radicals, and, (3) African Mercenaries, need to be broken down into more detail and then there would be a better understanding of the serious conflicts going on over there. I believe there is more to this conflict that is being deliberately hidden under general terms that we need to consider. But this article helped me to get closer to a better understanding. I read it twice to try and retain some information offered.

Thanks for posting.
 

Ankhur

Well-Known Member
REGISTERED MEMBER
Oct 4, 2009
14,325
2,954
Brooklyn
Occupation
owner of various real estate concerns
I. Who Are the Libyan Opposition, and II. Where Are the Libyan Rebel Arms Coming From?

I. Who Are the Libyan Opposition

1) Historically:

"If Muammar Al Gaddafi behaved paranoid, it was for good reason. It wasn't long after he reached the age of 27 and led a small group of junior military officers in a bloodless coup d'état against Libyan King Idris on September 1, 1969, that threats to his power and life emerged - from monarchists, Israeli Mossad, Palestinian disaffections, Saudi security, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO), British intelligence, United States antagonism and, in 1995, the most serious of all, Al Qaeda-like Libyan Islamic fighting group, known as Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya. The Colonel reacted brutally, by either expelling or killing those he feared were against him."3



2) National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL)

"With the aim of overthrowing Libyan strongman Muammar Khadafy, Israel and the U.S. trained anti-Libyan rebels in a number of West and Central African countries. The Paris-based African Confidential newsletter reported on January 5th, 1989, that the US and Israel had set up a series of bases in Chad and other neighboring countries to train 2000 Libyan rebels captured by the Chad army. The group, called The National Front for the Salvation of Libya, was based in Chad."4

"US official records indicate that funding for the Chad-based secret war against Libya also came from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Israel and Iraq.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=23947
 

Omowale Jabali

The Cosmic Journeyman
REGISTERED MEMBER
Sep 29, 2005
20,817
9,454
Temple of Kali, Yubaland
Occupation
Creative Industrialist
3) National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO),

"The main group leading the insurrection is the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition which includes the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL). The NFSL, which is leading the violence, is a U.S.-sponsored armed militia of mostly Libyan expatriates and tribes opposed to al-Qaddafi."7

4) Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya (Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, LIFG)

"The LIFG was founded in 1995 by a group of mujahideen veterans who had fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Upon their return to Libya they grew angry about what they viewed as the corruption and impiety of the Libyan regime and formed the LIFG to create a state that would show what they believed to be the true character of the Libyan people.

The most significant LIFG attack was a 1996 attempt to assassinate Gadhafi; LIFG members led by Wadi al-Shateh threw a bomb underneath his motorcade. The group also stages guerilla-style attacks against government security forces from its mountain bases. Although most LIFG members are strictly dedicated to toppling Gadhafi, intelligence reportedly indicates that some have joined forces with al-Qaida to wage jihad against Libyan and Western interests worldwide. ....
As recently as February 2004, then-Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that "one of the most immediate threats [to U.S. security] is from smaller international Sunni extremist groups that have benefited from al-Qaida links. They include ... the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group."8

"In recent days Libyan officials have distributed security documents giving the details of Sufiyan al-Koumi, said to be a driver for Osama bin Laden, and of another militant allegedly involved in an "Islamic emirate" in Derna, in now-liberated eastern Libya. Koumi, the documents show, was freed in September 2010 as part of a "reform and repent" initiative organised by Saif al-Islam, Gaddafi's son....

The LIFG, established in Afghanistan in the 1990s, has assassinated dozens of Libyan soldiers and policemen. In 2009, to mark Gaddafi's 40 years in power, it apologised for trying to kill him and agreed to lay down its arms. MI6 [British Intelligence] has been accused in the past of supporting it. Six LIFG leaders, still in prison, disavowed their old ways and explained why fighting Gaddafi no longer constituted "legitimate" jihad. Abdul-Hakim al-Hasadi, another freed LIFG member, denied the official claims. "Gaddafi is trying to divide the people," he told al-Jazeera. "He claims that there is an Islamist emirate in Derna and that I am its emir. He is taking advantage of the fact that I am a former political prisoner."

Derna is famous as the home of a large number of suicide bombers in Iraq. It is also deeply hostile to Gaddafi. "Residents of eastern Libya in general, and Derna in particular, view the Gaddadfa (Gaddafi's tribe) as uneducated, uncouth interlopers from an inconsequential part of the country who have 'stolen' the right to rule in Libya," US diplomats were told in 2008, in a cable since released by WikiLeaks.

The last 110 members of the LIFG were freed on 16 February, the day after the Libyan uprising began. One of those released, Abdulwahab Mohammed Kayed, is the brother of Abu Yahya Al Libi, one of al Qaida's top propagandists. Koumi fled Libya and is said to have ended up in Afghanistan working for Bin Laden. Captured in Pakistan, he was handed over to the US and sent to Guantánamo Bay in 2002. In 2009 he was sent back to Libya.9 US counter-terrorist experts have expressed concern that al-Qaida could take advantage of a political vacuum if Gaddafi is overthrown. But most analysts say that, although the Islamists' ideology has strong resonance in eastern Libya, there is no sign that the protests are going to be hijacked by them.10
 

Omowale Jabali

The Cosmic Journeyman
REGISTERED MEMBER
Sep 29, 2005
20,817
9,454
Temple of Kali, Yubaland
Occupation
Creative Industrialist
5) Transitional National Council

"A RIVAL transitional government to the regime of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi looks set to win US and other international support as momentum builds to oust the longtime dictator.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed yesterday that the Obama administration was reaching out to opponents of Colonel Gaddafi. She said the US was willing to offer ‘any kind of assistance' to remove him from power.

Protest leaders who have taken control in Libya's eastern cities claim to have established a transitional "national council" that amounts to rival rule. They have called on the country's army to join them as they prepare for an attack on the capital, Tripoli, where the Libyan leader retains control.

Confident the Libyan leader's 42-year rule was coming to an end, Mrs Clinton said yesterday: ‘We are just at the beginning of what will follow Gaddafi.'"13
 

Create an account or login to comment

You must be a member in order to leave a comment

Create account

Create an account on our community. It's easy!

Log in

Already have an account? Log in here.

Thread starter Similar threads Forum Replies Date
HODEE Health and Wellness : COVID-19 vaccine trials report cases of brief Facial Paralysis. Black Health and Wellness 1
chuck African American History Culture : A Brief Note About Our History In The United States: African American History Culture 2
S Black People : White Genocide of Afrikan People - A Brief History Black People Open Forum 2
chuck Black People : A Brief History Lesson: Black People Open Forum 0
Gorilla Black Atheists : Documentary: A Brief History Of Disbelief and The Atheism Tapes Atheist Study Group 0
chuck Black People : A Brief History of the Occupy Movement: Black People Open Forum 0
A Black People : Brief intro. to utilitarianism Black People Open Forum 0
Chevron Dove Black People : A Brief Timeline Black People Open Forum 0
R Black Poetry : See decisions made by world religion most stay brief Black Poetry - Get Your Flow On! 8
Sekhemu Black Spirituality Religion : A brief discourse on Initiation by a Priest of Olokun Black Spirituality / Religion - General Discussion 0
A Amun-Ra : A Brief Look at Flood Myths Amun-Ra 11
Clyde C Coger Jr Black People Politics : The case for shortening the presidential transition Black People Politics 0
Writeous1 Black People : The Jacob Blake Case - The Truth Black People Open Forum 16
HODEE Black Travel : JUST IN CASE.. coverage ( INSURANCE ) Black Travel 0
G Law Forum : Police Blue Wall of Silence: A Case Study In The Arrogance of Lies To Protect Criminals Who Wear The Badge Law Forum - Prisons - Gun Ownership 7
Clyde C Coger Jr Law Forum : $600,000 awarded to man involved in racial discrimination case Law Forum - Prisons - Gun Ownership 3
Clyde C Coger Jr African American History Culture : America's last slave ship could offer a case for reparations African American History Culture 2
dattaswami1 Black Christians : A true devotee must always express that the will of God should always happen either in his case or in the case of the others Christian Study Group 0
Ndugu Black People Politics : Do we have a "Just in Case Plan if that fool gets Re- elected?? Black People Politics 11
HODEE Black People Politics : GARLAND...may hear this case? YES!! Black People Politics 2
Clyde C Coger Jr African American History Culture : To the president: a government class fought for the release of unsolved FBI civil rights case files African American History Culture 0
Clyde C Coger Jr Law Forum : Kavanaugh's Dissent In Louisiana's Abortion Case Means Trouble For Roe v. Wade Law Forum - Prisons - Gun Ownership 1
Perfection Black People Politics : ├ѕтυdιeѕ in the 乙ulu┤Warfare, Leadership, State Formation: The Case of the Zulu Kingdom, 1808-1879 Black People Politics 0
Clyde C Coger Jr Black People : D.L. Hughley, T.I. Call Double Standard Between Texas School Shooting And Tay-K Murder Case Black People Open Forum 1
HODEE Black People Politics : A New Book with perspectives on: The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump Black People Politics 0
Clyde C Coger Jr Egypt : Ancient Egyptian Pharaoh is World’s Oldest Case of Gigantism Egypt 10
jamesfrmphilly Law Forum : baltimore-cops-in freddie-gray-case face internal-discipline Law Forum - Prisons - Gun Ownership 0
Clyde C Coger Jr Black Positive People : Woman convicted in ‘stand your ground’ case to help others Black People Doing Positive Things 0
Liberty Black People Politics : Clinton Made Her Case to Black Voters. Why Didn’t They Hear Her? Black People Politics 9
jamesfrmphilly Law Forum : eric-garner-case-shake-up Law Forum - Prisons - Gun Ownership 0
jamesfrmphilly Law Forum : Florida-Voters-Kick-FL-State-Attorney-Angela-Corey-of-Zimmerman-Case-Fame-Out-of-Office Law Forum - Prisons - Gun Ownership 2
jamesfrmphilly Law Forum : chicago-fires-7-cops-for lying in laquan-mcdonald case Law Forum - Prisons - Gun Ownership 0
Clyde C Coger Jr Law Forum : Official: FBI reviewing SC couple's cavity search case Law Forum - Prisons - Gun Ownership 0
Orisons Black People : Thank God our Women are on the case/sorting things out! Black People Open Forum 2
Liberty Black Money Business Jobs : U.S. Economy Collapse: What You Should Know in Case of US Economic Collapse Black Money Business Jobs 0
AACOOLDRE Brother AACOOLDRE : Lincoln's views of the Dred scott case AACOOLDRE 4
jamesfrmphilly Black People : RICO case against ferguson.... Black People Open Forum 1
Cb_parent Black People Politics : NAACP legal defense fund petitions judge for Michael Brown case Black People Politics 13
RAPTOR The Police : Historic Police Brutality Case, Family of Homeless Denver Pastor Killed in Custody Awarded $4.6M Law Forum - Prisons - Gun Ownership 1
Kemetstry Law Forum : WHY "Catching a Case" Isnt a Rite of Passage Law Forum - Prisons - Gun Ownership 20
shaka64 Black People : Mark Ciavarella Jr., Pennsylvania Judge, Gets 28 Years In 'Kids For Cash' Case Black People Open Forum 0
coey30 Black Poetry : CASE of the IDIOT…. Black Poetry - Get Your Flow On! 1
OldSoul OldSoul : The Case for Reparations - Atlantic Magazine Editor Ta-Nehisi Coates OldSoul 12
CSmith Black People : The Case for Reparations Black People Open Forum 5
Kadijah Law Forum : Police making cellphone searches without a warrant - 4th amendment case before SCOTUS Law Forum - Prisons - Gun Ownership 27
Clyde C Coger Jr Law Forum : Kevin Trudeau sentenced to 10 years in criminal contempt case Law Forum - Prisons - Gun Ownership 9
Therious Law Forum : Another stand your ground case in FLA Law Forum - Prisons - Gun Ownership 13
blazejay Black People : is it a case of racism if.... Black People Open Forum 4
Alarm Clock Black People : Ken Burns: Bill De Blasio Has Agreed To Settle 10-Year-Old Central Park Five Case Black People Open Forum 0
Alarm Clock Black People : UN experts: U.S. needs to wrap up review of Trayvon Martin case and examine laws Black People Open Forum 2
Similar threads


















































Latest profile posts

sekou kasimu wrote on ZIbijah's profile.
Have you read "The Iceman Inheritance: Prehistoric Origins of Western Man's Racism, Sexism, and Aggression"?
$1 Billion Black dollars in 30 days
Destee wrote on Marcchris's profile.
Hi @Marcchris ... Welcome Welcome Welcome!!! :wave: ... Thanks for joining us AND becoming a Premium Member! :cheerleader: ... I am honored. Please make yourself right at home! Much Love and Peace.
Destee wrote on rhymebad's profile.
I Love You! :love:
Destee wrote on dunwiddat's profile.
Good to see you Sister! :cheerleader:
Top